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57 
The Modern Problem-Solving Court Movement: 
Domination of Discourse and Untold Stories of 
Criminal Justice Reform 
Mae C. Quinn  
INTRODUCTION 
There is a chasm between the rhetoric about and the reality of 
modern court reform movements. It is a deeply troubling divide. This 
Article, responding to the work of Professor Jane Spinak, is not 
concerned with innovations within the family court system. Rather, it 
examines modern criminal justice reforms.
1
 It focuses on the claims 
of the contemporary ―problem-solving court‖ movement—a 
movement that has resulted in the development of thousands of 
specialized criminal courts across the country over the last two 
decades.
2
 
 
  Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law, St. Louis. The author can be 
contacted at mquinn@wulaw.wustl.edu. Many thanks to Annette Appell for inviting me to 
participate in the Washington University School of Law ninth annual Access to Equal Justice 
Colloquium, and for reading an earlier draft of this essay. Karen Tokarz deserves special thanks 
for establishing and supporting this important yearly public interest symposium at Washington 
University. I am grateful also to Kathy Goldwasser, Bob Kuehn, and Laura Rosenbury for their 
helpful comments and feedback. Finally, my research assistant, Anna Gracey, greatly improved 
this essay with her diligent research, careful editing, and suggested additions. 
 1. At the March 2009 Access to Equal Justice Colloquium, I offered remarks in response 
to the keynote address of Professor Jane Spinak. See Access to Equal Justice Colloquium 
Video, available at http://abhall.mediasite.com/abhall/Viewer/?peid=bb6a8cfaae8947f1b6fdb 
173da88deda (last visited Oct. 25, 2009). Professor Spinak‘s important work raises similar 
questions about family court reform efforts. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967) 
(identifying differences between the rhetoric offered by the early juvenile court movement and 
the realities of such institutions in practice). 
 2. I use the term ―problem-solving courts‖ here, as that is used by proponents of such 
venues—those whose account this essay seeks to challenge. Like others who question the 
propriety and efficacy of such institutions, I find this name to be problematic. First, it fails to 
provide adequate parameters. It is unclear how we are to determine which courts are problem-
solving and which courts are not. In addition, as discussed infra, as many of these ―problem-
solving‖ courts do not necessarily solve the problems they set out to address, the term is 
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Problem-solving courts, which focus on social concerns like 
addiction, domestic violence, mental health issues, and prostitution, 
purport to be a great success. Their proponents assert that such courts 
cure addiction, address intimate violence, prevent recidivism, reduce 
costs, and even save lives. But this success story—the seemingly 
linear and dominant narrative offered primarily by proponents of 
problem-solving courts—is misleading. The near-singular tale of 
triumph told by modern court reformers obscures alternative 
experiences within, and contrary opinions about, these contemporary 
institutions. It also fails to acknowledge another important story—
that is, the checkered history of criminal court experimentation in this 
country.  
We need to mine and carefully consider these currently 
submerged accounts in order to fully appreciate both the promises 
and the significant perils of contemporary criminal court reform 
efforts.
3
 This Article is intended to help in that endeavor by urging 
more meaningful discussions about judicial experiments. It is a 
project that focuses on the largely untold present and the forgotten 
past of such institutions, with a view toward helping shape criminal 
courts and justice in the future.  
 
somewhat of a misnomer. Perhaps, therefore, a term like ―problem-oriented‖ courts, which I 
also use in this essay, might be more accurate. See generally Kay Levine, The New Prosecution, 
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1125 (2005) (using the term ―problem-oriented‖ to describe such 
institutions).  
 3. A few months after I gave my talk at Washington University, which built upon similar 
presentations I have given across the country over the years, a book was released that purports 
to examine this very question. See PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY? (Paul Higgins & Mitchell B. Mackinem eds., 2009) (Greenwood Publishing 
Group notes that the new book details ―the ‗promise and potential perils‘ of problem-solving 
courts,‖ and that ―the authors represented here examine the development of the problem-solving 
court movement, the rationale for the courts, the approaches they take, and their anticipated 
benefits and potential pitfalls.‖). The book ―begins with an essay by Center for Court 
Innovation director Greg Berman,‖ a compelling leading advocate for such courts, see infra 
note 22, and references ―numerous Center publications and projects throughout.‖ See Center for 
Court Innovation, http://www.courtinnovation.org (last visited Oct. 25, 2009). In addition, one 
of the book‘s editors, Mitchell Mackinem, is a former South Carolina Drug Court Coordinator. 
See PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: JUSTICE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY?, supra, at 195. 
However, the book also includes more concerned and critical voices. Thus, perhaps calls for 
more open and meaningful discussion around these issues finally are being heeded. As this 
Article suggests, it is important that they continue.  
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I. COURT REFORM‘S DOMINANT DISCOURSE:  
THE MODERN SUCCESS STORY
4
 
The problem-solving court movement, many proclaim, began in 
this country with the founding of the Miami Drug Treatment Court in 
1989.
5
 When that court opened two decades ago, it was viewed as 
groundbreaking in its attempt to remedy a social problem through 
informal criminal court processes.
6
 Developed by the criminal justice 
community as an alternative to incarceration for qualifying 
defendants, the Miami Drug Court sought to address the underlying 
issue that brought narcotics offenders into the system—addiction—as 
opposed to the specific crime charged.
7
  
In the Miami Drug Court, the judge changed from passive arbiter 
to active participant in helping defendants reach sobriety by 
rewarding success but sanctioning setbacks with jail terms and other 
penalties.
8
 Prosecutors and defense attorneys changed their roles, too, 
 
 4. My friend and colleague, Iris Goodwin, recently reminded me that domination of 
discourse is, of course, a topic that long has been the focus of discussion and analysis in a 
variety of fields. See, e.g., BEN AGGER, THE DISCOURSE OF DOMINATION: FROM THE 
FRANKFURT SCHOOL TO POSTMODERNISM (1992); MICHEL FOUCAULT, ARCHAEOLOGY OF 
KNOWLEDGE (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., Pantheon 1972) (1971); JURGEN HABERMAS, 
DISCOURSE ETHICS: NOTES ON A PROGRAM OF JUSTIFICATION (1990); Linda Alcoff, Cultural 
Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory, 13 SIGNS: J. 
WOMEN CULTURE & SOC‘Y 405 (1988). 
 5. See, e.g., JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT 
MOVEMENT 39 (2001); see also John S. Goldkamp, The Origin of the Treatment Drug Court in 
Miami, in THE EARLY DRUG COURTS: CASE STUDIES IN JUDICIAL INNOVATION 19, 19 (W. 
Clinton Terry III ed., 1999); JAMES A. INCIARDI ET AL., DRUG CONTROL AND THE COURTS 68 
(1996); Miami Dade Drug Court, http://www.miamidrugcourt.gov (last visited Oct. 25, 2009) 
(―In 1989, the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida was the first in the nation to implement Drug 
Court, a diversion and treatment program for drug offenders which is overseen by the Court.‖). 
 6. Michael Isikoff & William Booth, Miami ―Drug Court‖ Demonstrates Reno‘s 
Unorthodox Approach, WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 1993, at A1 (calling the 1989 Miami Drug Court 
Janet Reno‘s ―most ambitious experiment‖); Ronald Smothers, Miami Tries Treatment, Not 
Jail, in Drug Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1993, at A10 (Miami Court ―the first of its kind‖).  
 7. Isikoff & Booth, supra note 6, at A1; Smothers, supra note 6, at A10.  
 8. See Peggy Fulton Hora, William G. Schma & John T.A. Rosenthal, Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice 
System‘s Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 470–77 
(1998); James L. Nolan, Jr., Therapeutic Adjudication, 39 SOC‘Y 29, 32–36 (2002); INCIARDI 
ET AL., supra note 5, at 71–73 (describing the judge as ―case manager‖ in modern drug 
treatment courts); see also Deborah Chase & Peggy Fulton Hora, The Best Seat in the House: 
The Court Assignment and Judicial Satisfaction, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 209 (2009) (claiming that 
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shedding their adversarial posture to become part of the treatment 
court ―team.‖9 This model was and is depicted as a success.10  
Today, twenty years after the Miami Court opened its doors, over 
2,300 drug treatment courts are operating across the country and 
more are on their way.
11
 The purportedly ―innovative‖ methods 
utilized in the Miami Drug Court—concern for remedying a 
particularized social problem, active judicial involvement through 
defendant-monitoring and sanctioning, and informal courtroom 
processes—have been adopted and applied in other problem-solving 
court settings. Jurisdictions have created everything from domestic 
violence courts, to community courts, to mental health courts, to gun 
courts, to smoking courts for juveniles.
12
 It would appear that for 
 
―problem-solving court judges were more likely to report believing that the role of the court 
should include helping litigants address the problems that brought them‖ to the court). 
 9. See New York State Unified Court System: Drug Treatment Courts, 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courts/problem_solving/drugcourts/index.shtml (last visited Oct. 
25, 2009) (―What distinguishes drug courts is their uniquely collaborative approach to treatment 
. . . . This process involves coordination between defense attorneys, prosecutors, treatment and 
education providers and law enforcement officials.‖); INCIARDI ET AL., supra note 5, at 73 
(―Perhaps even more nontraditional are the roles performed by other Miami drug court officials, 
activities that have been described variously as ‗unorthodox,‘ ‗nonadversarial,‘ and ‗team 
oriented.‘‖). 
 10. See, e.g., GREG BERMAN & JOHN FEINBLATT, GOOD COURTS 131–50 (2005) 
(characterizing problem-solving courts as ―good courts‖ with good results by cataloguing 
―success stories‖ from litigants affected by such institutions); ROBERT V. WOLF, PRINCIPLES OF 
PROBLEM-SOLVING JUSTICE, CENTER FOR COURT INNOVATION 1 (2007) (claiming ―a growing 
body of research literature has begun to validate the[] effectiveness‖ of problem-solving 
courts); Drug Enforcement Agency, What Are Drug Treatment Courts?, http://www.usdoj. 
gov/dea/ongoing/treatment.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2009) (explaining why drug treatment 
courts are a ―success‖ and describing one New York program as a ―success story‖).2 
 11. See Center for Court Innovation, Drug Treatment Courts, http://www.courtinnovation. 
org/index.cfm?fuseaction=page.viewPage&pageID=576&documentTopicID=21 (last visited 
Oct. 25, 2009) (noting that over 2,100 drug courts now operate across the United States); U.S. 
Drug Czar Addresses 2,500 Drug Court Professionals, Voices Strong Support for Expanding 
Drug Courts Throughout the Nation, REUTERS (2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
pressRelease/idUS146385+11-Jun-2009+PRN20090611 (last visited Oct. 25, 2009) (―There are 
currently 2,301 Drug Courts annually serving 120,000 people per year.‖); see also WOLF, supra 
note 10, at 1 (―[t]oday there are over 2,500 problem-solving courts in the United States.‖).. 
 12. See, e.g., Jaclyn O‘Malley, Mental Health Court Seen as Example For State, RENO 
GAZETTE-J., Dec. 10, 2006, at 1A; Richard B. Hoffman, The Viable Alternative: Community 
Courts, WASH. LAW. Oct. 2004, at 35; Joan Kenney & Charlotte Whiting, Press Release, New 
Firearm Session of the Lynn District Court (Jan. 31, 2006), available at http://www.mass.gov/ 
courts/press/pr013106.html; EMILY SACK, FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, CREATING A 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT: GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES (2002), http://endabuse.org/ 
userfiles/file/Judicial/FinalCourt_Guidelines.pdf; Hanna Sampson, Court‘s Aim is to Extinguish 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol31/iss1/5
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nearly every problem in our society, there exists a specialty court 
within the criminal justice system that is trying to ―solve‖ it.  
Yet, proponents of the modern problem-solving court movement 
continue to call for even more specialized institutions, along with 
broader acceptance of their nontraditional approach to criminal case 
processing.
13
 Toward this end, many judges broadcast the work of 
their courts by publicizing drug court graduations and asking those 
honored to share success stories publically.
14
 Newspapers and the 
Internet are filled with accounts of how problem-solving courts 
―saved‖ these individuals.15 
More systemically, the Conference of Chief Judges, which 
represents judges from the high courts of every state, has established 
a ―national agenda‖ to encourage further implementation of problem-
solving court programs.
16
 The agenda calls for each jurisdiction to 
develop a particularized ―state plan to expand the use of the 
principles and methods of problem-solving courts.‖17 It also calls for 
judges to reach beyond the courthouse walls and press law schools to 
―include the principles and methods of problem-solving courts in 
their curricula‖ in order to train lawyers to embrace problem-solving 
 
Teen Smoking, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 11, 2004, at 1BR, available at http://www.countyjudges. 
com/News/schiff3.htm. At least one city has considered creating a specialized prostitution 
court. See Bill Harness, New Prostitution Court Eyed, NASHVILLE CITY PAPER, Oct. 12, 2004, 
http://nashvillecitypaper.com/content/city-news/new-prostitution-court-eyed. 
 13. See, e.g., Daniel Becker & Maura D. Corrigan, Moving Problem-Solving Courts into 
the Mainstream, 18 CT. MANAGER 6 (2003).  
 14. See, e.g., Jim O‘Hara, Drug Court Graduates Celebrate Life and Sobriety, THE POST-
STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), June 25, 2009, at B8, available at http://syracuse.come/news/ 
index.ssf/2009/06/drug_court_graduates_celebrate.html (reporting that New York State Chief 
Judge Jonathan Lippman presided over the drug court graduation at the Onondaga County 
Courthouse and congratulated the graduating defendants on their accomplishments); Press 
Release, Ky. Court of Justice, Supreme Court Deputy Chief Judge Scott to be Guest Speaker at 
First Rowan County Drug Court Graduation Dec. 22 (Dec. 21, 2007), http://courts.ky.gov/ 
pressreleases/Rowan+County+Drug+Court+Graduation.htm. 
 15. See, e.g., Video: Watch Trey Anastasio Tell His Drug Court Story (National 
Association of Drug Court Professionals), http://www.nadcp.org/learn/do-drug-courts-work 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2009); see also Erik Eckholm, Innovative Courts Give Some Addicts a 
Chance to Straighten Out, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2008, at A1; Tracy M. Neal, ‗Drug Court 
Saved My Life‘ Benton County Drug Court Offers Second Chances, HERALD LEADER, May 13, 
2009.  
 16. See Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of State Court Administrators 
Annual Meeting, July 29, 2004, Resolution 22, http://cosca.ncsc.dni.us/WhitePapers/ 
Resolution-Natl%20Agenda-Final-Aug-04.pdf. 
 17. Id. 
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court techniques.
18
 Related think tanks and policy shops
19
 similarly 
have dominated the airwaves through white papers, websites, and 
press accounts—urging us to take the problem-solving court 
experiment ―to scale.‖20  
II. SUBTEXT AND ―OTHER‖ STORIES OF THE PROBLEM-SOLVING 
COURT MOVEMENT  
The seemingly singular story told about problem-solving courts 
portrays them as benevolent and exciting alternatives to the 
traditional case-processing model. It is difficult not to get swept up in 
the promise offered by those telling this tale. However, other 
accounts also must be considered.
21
 For a more robust understanding, 
dissenting voices and those who question such assurances also must 
be heard.
22
  
 
 18. See id. (―BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT CCJ and COSCA agree to develop a 
national agenda that includes . . . [asking] CCJ and COSCA members to request of the law 
schools in their states that they, as appropriate, include the principles and methods of problem-
solving courts in their curricula.‖). 
 19. In the interest of full disclosure, a decade ago I worked for one of the most prominent 
of these organizations—the Center for Court Innovation—mentioned throughout this essay. See 
Center for Court Innovation, http://www.courtinnovation.org (last visited Oct. 25, 2009) 
(describing the Center as a non-profit think tank that is a ―public-private partnership‖ between 
the New York State Unified Court System and the Fund for the City of New York‖). There are 
other such organizations. See, e.g., National Association of Drug Court Professionals, 
http://www.nadcp.org/nadcp-home (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).  
 20. BERMAN & FEINBLATT, supra note 10, at 195–98 (―The goal of ‗going to scale‘ is to 
spread key problem-solving principles throughout state court systems.‖).  
 21. Cf. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 
87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1988) (discussing the potential of storytelling to challenge the 
prevailing discourse); Luz E. Herrera, Challenging A Tradition of Exclusion: The History of an 
Unheard Story at Harvard Law School, 5 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 51, 51–52 (2002) (describing 
the need to dismantle dominant stories through the telling of broader narratives). 
 22. Proponents are just beginning to acknowledge publically the possibility of error in 
their experiments. This recognition is occurring now, after two decades of modern problem-
solving court efforts; it follows calls from skeptics, like this author, for the movement to slow 
down and take better stock of its actions. Even these moments of alleged self-awareness only 
consider the movement‘s failures in narrow, highly controlled ways. See, e.g., Greg Berman & 
Aubrey Fox, Embracing Failure: Lessons for Court Managers, 23 CT. MANAGER 4 (2008) 
(excerpting interviews with policymakers and practitioners); Greg Berman, Learning from 
Failure: A Roundtable on Criminal Justice Innovation, 1 J. CT. INNOVATION 97 (2008) 
(providing excerpts of a roundtable convened by the Center for Court Innovation and the United 
States Department of Justice). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol31/iss1/5
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Questions remain about the efficacy and propriety of problem-
solving courts. It is not at all clear that specialized courts offer a 
superior alternative to the traditional case-processing model in 
preventing recidivism or that they resolve the underlying social 
problems they are created to address. In addition, there has been 
insufficient study of the real economic costs of such courts, or the 
extent to which defendants‘ legal rights and our system of justice 
may be undermined by the informal procedures that such institutions 
use.  
As an initial matter, few are aware of the reasons the Miami Drug 
Court was established. Although reportedly focused on the problems 
of defendants, it was established largely to address a set of more 
utilitarian concerns for the system. Miami faced both staggering 
narcotics-based caseloads for prosecutors and jail overcrowding as a 
result of the 1980s ―drug war.‖23 Indeed, at the time it established the 
―first‖ drug court, Miami-Dade County was under court order to 
reduce its enormous jail population.
24
 It had to try something new.  
Other self-serving reasons may encourage replication of the drug 
court model, including substantial financial support offered by the 
federal government to those willing to establish such institutions. 
These reasons call into question the purportedly pure motives behind 
the ―therapy‖ being provided by our courts. The various and 
sometimes disparate goals and incentives underlying specialty courts 
must be more transparent if we are to understand the real story of 
these venues. This subtext may affect public perceptions and support, 
as well as the way outcomes are interpreted. This is a particularly 
important consideration when proponents of the problem-solving 
 
 23. Goldkamp, supra note 5, at 20–22 (―In a most basic sense, the implementation of the 
Miami Drug Court in 1989 was a response to this extraordinary growth in the drug-related 
criminal caseload in Dade County, to the strain it placed on most aspects of the criminal justice 
system, and to the perceived impact of drug-related crime and criminals on public safety in 
Dade County.‖); see also INCIARDI ET AL., supra note 5, at 65 (describing a 1989 state judicial 
conference, at which leaders from the largest states reported concerns about the backlog of drug 
cases in their courts). 
 24. INCIARDI ET AL., supra note 5, at 69 (noting that the county‘s jails were at least 6,000 
inmates beyond capacity); see also NOLAN, supra note 5, at 44–45 (describing the ―structural 
causes‖ that spurred the drug court experiment and noting ―the practical forces of correctional 
and courtroom costs, the volume of offenders, and limited prison and jail space forced judicial 
actors to consider alternatives‖). 
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court movement claim part of the drive to create such venues is to 
increase public trust in courts. 
The perspectives of the criminal defense bar also were largely 
missing from initial narratives about these courts. Nearly a decade 
ago, I was one of the first defense lawyers in the United States to 
write about my experience practicing in a drug court.
25
 I argued that 
the teamwork approach urged in such institutions could thwart 
defense attorneys‘ ethical obligation to zealously defend their clients 
and undermine defendants‘ rights to due process of law.26  
Since that time, more defense attorneys—individually and on an 
institutional level—have raised similar concerns.27 Over the past two 
years the National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys 
(―NACDL‖) convened a task force to examine potential issues raised 
by problem-solving courts. It held public hearings across the country 
to hear testimony from defenders and others based on their 
experiences within the courts.
28
 Just this month it issued its report 
 
 25. See Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway?, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 37 (2000–01) [hereinafter Quinn, Whose Team]; cf. Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking 
Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Litigators, 104 YALE L.J. 763, 829–30 (1995). 
Eastman writes: 
[w]hile a purely personal voice in our writing would be ―as empty‖ as the purely 
professional . . . hopefully . . . we find ways to talk that will reflect more fully what we 
actually know to be true of ourselves and our minds, of our languages and our cultures 
. . . If a lawyer is well regarded, her voice can be persuasive . . . .  
 Speaking in our personal voices can be persuasive for precisely the reasons the 
historian and journalist are more persuasive, with speech that is invitation and not 
coercive. Such speech invites the judge to experience the tragedies as the authors have. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 26. Quinn, Whose Team, supra note 25, at 50–52. 
 27. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Contraindicated Drug Courts, 55 UCLA L. REV. 783 (2008); 
Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Problem-Solving Courts and the 
Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. REV. 1459 (2004); Tamar M. Meekins, Risky 
Business: Criminal Specialty Courts and the Ethical Obligations of the Zealous Criminal 
Defender, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 75 (2007); Tamar M. Meekins, ―Specialized Justice‖: The 
Over-Emergence of Specialty Courts and the Threat of a New Criminal Defense Paradigm, 40 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 (2006); see also AM. COUNCIL OF CHIEF DEFENDERS, TEN TENETS OF 
FAIR AND EFFECTIVE PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS (2002), http://www.nlada.org/DMS/ 
Documents/ 1019501190.93/document_info.  
 28. See NACDL Task Force Holds Hearings on Operations of Specialized Courts, 16 
A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. SEC. NEWS. 12 (Spring 2008) (―The task force is charged with looking at 
the role of defense counsel in these courts, the due process and constitutional rights of 
defendants in these courts, as well as the courts‘ overall effectiveness.‖).  
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summarizing its findings, which include many of the concerns I have 
raised previously.
29
  
In addition, the Maryland State Office of the Public Defender 
recently filed a lawsuit challenging the very existence of Maryland‘s 
Drug Treatment Court.
30
 In the suit, defenders argued that the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City lacked fundamental jurisdiction to create a 
drug court for felony charges, and that the court‘s sanctioning 
practices violated constitutional double jeopardy principles.
31
 
Carefully vetted and well-crafted accounts of reformers also 
overlook the stories of the thousands of defendants who ―fail out‖ of 
problem-solving courts. These defendants often are sent to prison for 
faltering in their treatment efforts—sometimes for longer periods 
than they would have served had they forgone the problem-solving 
court option.
32
 They are not invited to speak to high school classes or 
community groups. What becomes of these individuals—and their 
views on problem-solving courts, or the legal system in general—is 
largely missing from the conversation.
33
  
Also absent is a full accounting of these failures. Indeed, although 
reformers have declared their success, questions remain about the 
efficacy of purported problem-solving institutions. Recent estimates 
suggest that between one-third and one-half of all drug treatment 
 
 29. NACDL, AMERICA‘S PROBLEM-SOLVING COURTS: THE CRIMINAL COSTS OF 
TREATMENT AND THE CASE FOR REFORM (Sept. 2009). See also Mae C. Quinn, Testimony at 
the NACDL Problem-Solving Courts Task Force (Nov. 14, 2008) (transcript on file with 
author).  
 30. See Brown v. State, 971 A.2d 932, 932 (Md. 2009); see also Henri E. Cauvin, Public 
Defender Calls Venues Unconstitutional, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2009, at B3. 
 31. Ultimately the Court of Appeals of Maryland denied the challenge on procedural and 
not substantive grounds. First, it found that ―Petitioner‘s ‗fundamental jurisdiction‘ argument 
overlooks the critical distinction between (1) lack of jurisdiction, and (2) the improper exercise 
of jurisdiction.‖ Brown v. State, 971 A.2d at 936. Second, it found that the double jeopardy 
claim was not properly preserved for review. Id. at 936–37. Indeed, the court suggested that 
drug court practices might be challenged in individual cases by way of new sentencing hearing 
requests. Id. at 936. 
 32. See Quinn, Whose Team, supra note 25, at 50.  
 33. Cf. NOLAN, supra note 5, at 69 (recounting the story of a drug court judge who 
brought defendants to speak positively about her program before an audience of over 700 drug-
court professionals, only to have the defendants unexpectedly complain about problems they 
were having in the court—including unfair treatment by drug program counselors and a lack of 
educational and other rehabilitative services).  
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court defendants fail out of treatment.
34
 Thus, for a large percentage 
of defendants, the drug court model does not serve as an alternative 
to incarceration.
35
 Despite the nearly 300 million federal dollars spent 
on these nontraditional experiments, drug court defendants still are 
largely serving traditional prison sentences.
36
 Because drug court 
sentences often are longer than ordinary drug sentences, it is hard to 
see how drug courts save money in the long run.
37
  
In fact, in April 2002 the General Accounting Office (―GAO‖) 
warned that the returns were not all in on drug treatment courts and 
that more thorough study was needed.
38
 In a lengthy and detailed 
report, the GAO admonished the Department of Justice for not 
sufficiently managing the collection and use of operational and 
outcome data from federally funded drug court programs.
39
 It found 
that the Department fell short of its stated objectives of completing 
meaningful and comprehensive impact evaluations for such courts.
40
  
 
 34. Eckholm, supra note 15, at A1 (noting that in some New York drug courts, more than 
half of the defendants do not successfully complete the program). See also U.S. GEN. ACCT. 
OFF., GAO-01-187, D.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: BETTER COORDINATION NEEDED 
AMONG PARTICIPATING AGENCIES (2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d01187.pdf [hereinafter BETTER COORDINATION NEEDED] (reporting that in one study ―117 of 
the 279 defendants placed in drug court program successfully graduated‖). 
 35. See Quinn, Whose Team, supra note 25, at 49. 
 36. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GOA-02-434, BETTER DOJ DATA COLLECTION AND 
EVALUATION EFFORTS NEEDED TO MEASURE THE IMPACT OF DRUG TREATMENT COURT 
PROGRAMS 6 (2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02434.pdf [hereinafter BETTER DOJ 
COLLECTION AND EVALUATION EFFORTS NEEDED] (―Since fiscal year 1995, Congress has 
appropriated about $267 million in Violent Crime Act related funding to DOJ for the federal 
drug court program.‖) (footnote omitted). 
 37. See also Reginald Fluellen & Jennifer Trone, Vera Institute of Justice, Do Drug 
Courts Save Jail and Prison Beds?, SPECTRUM: J. ST. GOV‘T, Winter 2001, at 19 (noting that, 
to date, studies about alleged cost savings on prison bed space fail to account for an important 
set of variables: whether drug courts have targeted a population already prison-bound or may 
have simply changed the going sentencing rates for particular kinds of sentences, and whether 
jail sanctions are sufficiently considered in the calculus). 
 38. BETTER DOJ COLLECTION AND EVALUATION EFFORTS NEEDED, supra note 36, at 8 
(―DOJ cannot provide Congress, drug court program stakeholders, and others with reliable 
information on the performance and impact of federally funded drug court programs.‖). This 
report echoes concerns that first were raised by the GAO in 1997, and again in 2001. See U.S. 
GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-97-106, DRUG COURTS: OVERVIEW OF GROWTH, CHARACTERISTICS, 
AND RESULTS (1997); see also BETTER COORDINATION NEEDED, supra note 34. 
 39. BETTER DOJ DATA COLLECTION AND EVALUATION EFFORTS NEEDED, supra note 36, 
at 8–15.  
 40. Id. at 15–18. 
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In 2005, the GAO reviewed the 117 drug court evaluations—
many federally funded—that had been conducted between 1997 and 
2004.
41
 Of those studies, the GAO considered only twenty-seven 
methodologically sound for purposes of assessing recidivism and 
other success factors.
42
 The methodologically sound studies showed 
―fewer incidents of rearrests or reconvictions and a longer time until 
rearrest or reconviction than comparison group members‖;43 
however, there was not conclusive evidence to tie the reduction in 
recidivism to any particular drug court component or feature, such as 
judicial involvement or graduated sanctioning.
44
 Moreover, the GAO 
determined that ―[e]vidence about the effectiveness of drug court 
programs in reducing participants‘ substance abuse‖—the very 
problem drug courts are supposed to solve—―is limited and mixed.‖45  
Most recently, the Sentencing Project, an independent non-profit 
organization interested in criminal justice reforms, issued a report 
reviewing available research on the effectiveness of drug treatment 
courts.
46
 That April 2009 study expressed a number of concerns about 
drug court proponents‘ claims and identified various areas where 
more research was needed.
47
 For instance, the study indicated that 
although ―it is generally accepted that drug courts effectively reduce 
rearrest rates relative to simple probation or incarceration, there is 
some reason to be cautious when interpreting these results.‖48 It also 
explained that ―[s]ome studies show little or no impact from drug 
court participation and it can be difficult to specify which 
components of the program or the research design may be 
contributing to these results.‖49 
 
 41. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-05-219, ADULT DRUG COURTS: EVIDENCE INDICATES 
RECIDIVISM REDUCTIONS AND MIXED RESULTS FOR OTHER OUTCOMES 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05219.pdf. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 5. 
 44. Id. at 5–6. 
 45. Id. at 6. Such studies have prompted some to go so far as to call drug courts a ―fraud.‖ 
See, e.g., Steven K. Erickson, The Drug Court Fraud, http://www.cjlf.org/publctns/Guest/ 
DrugCourtFraud.pdf. 
 46. RYAN S. KING & JILL PASQUARELLA, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DRUG COURTS: A 
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (2009). 
 47. Id. at 1. 
 48. Id. at 6. 
 49. Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 31:57 
 
 
As I have argued elsewhere, the problem-solving court movement 
has oversold its innovations in other ways, too.
50
 Even less 
impressive than drug courts are the batterer intervention programs 
touted by many domestic violence court advocates as a revolutionary 
approach to abuse between intimates.
51
 The data demonstrate that 
such programs are ineffectual as a method of treatment—they simply 
do not work to deter violence.
52
 At best, they keep track of alleged 
batterers for at least the period of time they are in the mandated 
classes.
53
  
And victims‘ voices have been drowned out, too, by the dominant 
discourse surrounding domestic violence court practices. Women 
purportedly protected by the courts‘ no-drop and mandatory 
prosecution policies frequently oppose this black-and-white approach 
to intimate violence.
54
 Studies suggest that the courts‘ practices can 
even put women‘s lives at risk.55 Women‘s problems frequently are 
exacerbated rather than solved by a lack of financial and other 
support from their incarcerated partners.
56
 
 
 50. See Mae C. Quinn, Anna Moscowitz Kross and the Home Term Part: A Second Look 
at the Nation‘s First Criminal Domestic Violence Court, 41 AKRON L. REV. 733, 734–35 
(2008) [hereinafter Quinn, Home Term]. 
 51. See, e.g., Robin Mazur & Liberty Aldrich, What Makes a Domestic Violence Court 
Work?, JUDGES‘ J., Spring 2003, at 5. 
 52. See NAT‘L INST. OF JUST., DO BATTERER INTERVENTION PROGRAMS WORK? TWO 
STUDIES (2003), http://www.ncjrs.gove/pdffiles1/nij/200331.pdf; see also Quinn, Home Term, 
supra note 50, at 734–35. 
 53. See NAT‘L INST. OF JUST., supra note 52; see also Quinn, Home Term, supra note 50, 
at 734–35. 
 54. See Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741 (2007); see also 
G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the 
Conservation of the Battered Women‘s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237 (2005). 
 55. See, e.g., Radha Iyengar, Op-Ed., The Protection Battered Spouses Don‘t Need, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2007, at A19 (noting higher homicide rates in states with mandatory arrest 
policies for domestic violence). 
 56. See Erin L. Han, Note, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim 
Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159 (2003); see also 
NAT‘L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ECONOMIC ABUSE REPORT, http://www. 
ncadv.org/files/EconomicAbuse.pdf (discussing economic abuses and challenges faced by 
victims of intimate violence). 
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III. THE FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF UNITED STATES  
CRIMINAL COURT REFORM  
More fundamentally, specialized, problem-oriented criminal 
courts simply are not new or innovative. Despite claims by today‘s 
innovators that they are engaged in a series of firsts, the creation of 
specialized, problem-oriented courts is an old concept. Experiments 
with problem-oriented courts originated in this country about a 
century ago. The checkered history of criminal court reform is 
conspicuously absent from current conversations about problem-
solving courts.  
Innovators who came long before today‘s reformers made similar 
attempts to engage in social engineering through criminal court 
reform. Judge Anna Moscowitz Kross, a Russian immigrant who 
came to the United States at the end of the 1800s, was one of the first 
women to graduate from New York University School of Law in 
1910, one of the first women to practice law in New York, and one of 
the state‘s first woman judges.57 Kross spent the entirety of her legal 
career trying to reform the criminal justice system in ways that 
closely parallel the efforts of today‘s problem-solving court 
movement.
58
  
Kross‘s innovations took many forms. She established a number 
of specialized criminal courts that looked very much like what we are 
seeing today. She engaged in court reform work while she was a 
judge in New York City‘s Magistrates‘ Court, which is where low-
level, non-felony cases were prosecuted in New York City until the 
1960s.
59
 In this way, I argue that Kross was responsible for New 
 
 57. This Article is one of several works that will serve as the basis for a full-length 
biography examining Kross‘s life and work. See, e.g., Mae C. Quinn, Lady Vols Calling the 
Shots: Judge Anna Moscowitz Kross and Her Auxiliary Army of Criminal Court Case Workers, 
in FEMINIST LEGAL HISTORY: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON LAW (unpublished manuscript on file 
with author) [hereinafter Quinn, Lady Vols]; Quinn, Home Term, supra note 52; Mae C. Quinn, 
Revisiting Anna Moscowitz Kross‘s Critique of New York City‘s Women‘s Court: The 
Continued Problem of Solving the ‗Problem‘ of Prostitution with Specialized Criminal Courts, 
33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 665, 669 (2006) [hereinafter Quinn, Women‘s Court].  
 58. Quinn, Lady Vols, supra note 57, at 23–24; Quinn, Home Term, supra note 50, at 736; 
Quinn, Women‘s Court, supra note 57, at 669. See also Joan Cook, Obituary, Anna M. Kross 
Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1979, at D19. 
 59. See Quinn, Home Term, supra note 50, at 736; Quinn, Women‘s Court, supra note 57, 
at 696. 
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York‘s ―original‖ problem-solving court movement—a movement 
that largely has been forgotten by today‘s legal community. Looking 
back at Kross‘s early attempts at innovation is instructive given the 
similarities between alleged problem-solving then and now. Many of 
these parallels suggest that we may be returning to institutions and 
practices that grew out of paternalistic Progressive Era concerns,
60
 
and that were subsequently discarded as less than ideal in a modern 
system of criminal justice.  
For instance, in 1936 Kross established the Wayward Minors‘ 
Court for Girls to deal with young women accused of violating the 
law.
61
 In much the same way that specialty courts are funded by the 
Department of Justice today, the Wayward Minors‘ Court began with 
the support and backing of the federal Works Progress 
Administration (―WPA‖).62 The court dealt predominantly with 
women between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one who were 
charged with acts of prostitution and other ―sexual misconduct‖ 
under the Wayward Minors‘ Act.63  
 
 60. Quinn, Women‘s Court, supra note 57, at 665 (describing Kross‘s early work as a 
defense attorney and then as a judge who sought to ―save‖ sexually misguided women).  
 61. DORRIS CLARKE, THE WAYWARD MINORS‘ COURT: AN EVALUATIVE REVIEW OF 
PROCEDURES AND PURPOSES, 1936–1941, at 6 (1941); Anna M. Kross & Harold M. Grossman, 
Magistrates‘ Courts of the City of New York: Suggested Improvements, 7 BROOK. L. REV. 411, 
439–41 (1938) [hereinafter Kross & Grossman, Suggested Improvements] (noting that on 
March 2, 1936, an order of the chief magistrate authorized the creation of the Wayward Minors‘ 
Court and that ―female wayward minors are almost exclusively sex delinquents‖); Dealing with 
Delinquents, N.Y. HERALD TRIB., Mar. 25, 1937, at 20 (indicating that Kross presided over the 
Wayward Minors‘ Court since its inception). See also Quinn, Lady Vols, supra note 57, at 6; 
Quinn, Home Term, supra note 50, at 741. 
 62. See ANNA M. KROSS, PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH WAYWARD MINORS IN NEW 
YORK CITY, U.S. WORKS PROGRESS ADMIN. (1936). 
 63. Id. at 1. See also BERNARD C. FISHER, JUSTICE FOR YOUTH: THE COURTS FOR 
WAYWARD YOUTH IN NEW YORK CITY 21 (1955) (the court was ―concerned chiefly with the 
sexually promiscuous girl, the runaway, the undisciplined, defiant youngster, the neglected 
girl.‖).  
 The Wayward Minors‘ Act, passed in the 1920s, defined a wayward minor in relevant part 
as ―[a]ny person between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one‖ who is ―habitually addicted to the 
use of drugs or the intemperate use of intoxicating liquors‖; ―habitually associates with 
dissolute persons‖; ―is found of his or her own free will . . . in a house of prostitution‖; 
―habitually associates with . . . pimps‖ or other criminals; willfully disobeys parents and is ―in 
danger of becoming morally depraved‖; ―deserts his or her home‖ and is ―in danger of 
becoming morally depraved‖; or ―so deports himself or herself as to willfully injure or endanger 
the morals or health of himself or herself or of others.‖ Wayward Minors‘ Act, Title VII-A, 
Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 913-a. Anyone adjudicated a wayward minor was to be 
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Too old for New York‘s Children‘s Court,64 these young women 
otherwise would have been processed with adult female defendants in 
the Women‘s Court;65 however, Kross thought it was appropriate to 
divert and adjust their cases more informally.
66
 The Wayward 
Minors‘ Court for Girls began by holding sessions ―one day each 
week, at a different location‖ from the Women‘s Court.67 The 
experimental venue aimed to help young women rather than punish 
them, employing less ―legalistic‖ court processes68 which usually 
included pro se representation throughout treatment.
 69
  
 
placed on probation, unless it was determined, based upon prior misconduct or other reasons, 
that the minor was not ―fit‖ for probation. Section 913-c. In such cases, the wayward minor 
would be ―committed to any religious, charitable or other reformative institution authorized by 
law to receive commitments‖ for a period not to exceed three years. Section 913-c. See also 
FISHER, supra, at 82.  
 64. At the time, New York‘s Children‘s Court had jurisdiction over youths until they were 
sixteen. Children‘s Court Act of the City of New York, N.Y. LAW ch. 254, art. I, § 7 (1924) 
(contained as an Appendix to ―Children‘s Court of the City of New York, Annual Report of the 
Presiding Justice, 1925‖). See also WALTER GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE 
COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY 149 (1954) (―Under the Domestic Relations Court Act, a ‗child‘ 
ceases being a child upon his sixteenth birthday . . . . Most states have not shared New York‘s 
feeling that the differentiation can be made at the sixteen-year age level.‖); ALFRED J. KAHN, A 
COURT FOR CHILDREN: A STUDY OF THE NEW YORK CITY CHILDREN‘S COURT 30–35 (1953) 
(describing the history and development of New York‘s Children‘s Court). 
 65. Kross & Grossman, Suggested Improvements, supra note 61, at 439 (explaining that 
the chief magistrate‘s order permitted ―a separate part of the Women‘s Court, for the 
arraignment and trial of wayward minors only,‖ but that the cases were later moved to ―a 
location away from the Women‘s Court‖). See also Anna M. Kross & Harold M. Grossman, 
Magistrates‘ Courts of the City of New York: History and Organization, 7 BROOK. L. REV. 133, 
173–74 (1937) [hereinafter Kross & Grossman, Magistrates‘ Courts]. 
 66. Kross & Grossman, Suggested Improvements, supra note 61, at 430, 437 (―the 
Wayward Minors‘ part . . . seek[s] a scientific differentiation of treatment for the persons who 
appear therein, on a sound crime prevention theory‖ and ―seek[s] to do for adolescent offenders 
what the Children‘s Court does for defendants under the age of 16 years‖). See also CLARKE, 
supra note 61, at 6–7. 
 67. Kross & Grossman, Magistrates‘ Courts, supra note 65, at 173–74. See also CLARKE, 
supra note 61, at 6 (explaining that the court ―functions judicially as a separate [part] of the 
Women‘s Court, physically separated therefrom.‖). 
 68. Kross & Grossman, Suggested Improvements, supra note 61, at 440–41. 
 69. A person accused of being a wayward minor could only be adjudicated as such by a 
magistrate ―upon competent evidence‖ at a hearing, and would be afforded ―all the rights 
secured by law to defendants‖ under New York‘s Code of Criminal Procedure. Wayward 
Minors‘ Act, Section 913-b. See also FISHER, supra note 63, at 26 (―It is an interesting fact that 
defense attorneys are nowhere to be seen during proceedings in this court. The diminishing role 
of the legal counselor is but another corollary of the intention of the social court to minister to 
those in distress lest they fall into evils ways.‖). 
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In a booklet Kross wrote to describe and promote the court, she 
expressed concerns about preexisting formal and technical 
adjudication processes for young women alleged to be sexual 
delinquents.
70
 She believed that some young women needed court 
intervention, even if there was not sufficient evidence to convict 
them.
71
 Accordingly, the Wayward Minors‘ Court sought to 
―minimize the strictly legalistic character of the court as a tribunal‖ 
while using ―individualized and socialized techniques and 
procedures‖ to provide assistance to the wayward young women 
before it.
72
  
For instance, at a first appearance in the adult Women‘s Court, the 
magistrate decided whether sufficient information existed for a 
formal complaint; if so, the defendant was arraigned and formal trial 
held.
73
 If sufficient grounds for a complaint did not exist, the court 
simply dismissed the case.
74
 By contrast, in the Wayward Minors‘ 
Part:  
 Upon the first appearance of the girl complete Intake 
information is presented to the presiding Magistrate. The 
summary of the Intake Interview sets forth not only the 
immediate complaint but also the real problems involved, 
 
 70. KROSS, supra note 62, at 2. Kross noted that ―prior to the establishment of this 
Wayward Minors‘ Part of the Women‘s Court, it was customary for presiding Magistrates to 
hear charges against Wayward Minors in the Women‘s Court proper (or in Chambers), and 
either to dismiss charges or to adjudicate.‖ Id. 
 71. Id.  
If the case was dismissed, unless a private agency became interested in a special girl, 
there were no facilities for supervision or assistance. While the private agencies 
cooperated to some extent, there were no procedures for referral and no concerted 
effort toward defining, coordinating or centralizing facilities of public or private 
agencies. No investigation was made of environmental, social, mental or physical 
background of the defendant. The Magistrate proceeded merely on the evidence 
technically presented by complaining witnesses. 
Id. 
 72. KROSS, supra note 62, at 16 (noting that the procedures of the Wayward Minors‘ 
Court were ―predicated on the theory of the desirability of adjustment without adjudication, 
thus avoiding the stigma of unnecessary adjudication‖). See also CLARKE, supra note 61, at 17; 
id. at 10 (―From its inception, this court has aimed to ADJUST rather than to adjudicate; and 
commitment is resorted to only after all other expedients have been tried.‖). 
 73. CLARKE, supra note 61, at 12–13. 
 74. KROSS, supra note 62, at 5–6. 
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whether they be economic, vocational, family i[n]compatibility 
or any other reason. . . . At the first appearance . . . the 
complaint is formally read to the girl and she is advised of her 
legal rights. The Judge explains to her that this formal 
procedure is observed to cover all necessary legal 
requirements. However, this is the only formal procedure 
observed at this stage.
75
 
 From that point forward, as in many of today‘s problem-oriented 
courts, formal courtroom processes were jettisoned. Instead, the court 
engaged in therapeutic interventions based upon the individual needs 
and problems of the accused.
76
 Because the Probation Department did 
not have sufficient resources to adequately investigate these issues on 
a pretrial basis, and in fact was legally precluded from doing so, 
Kross created her own ―cooperating agency‖ to do this work.77 Her 
organization—the Magistrates‘ Court Social Services Bureau—was 
comprised mostly of volunteers whom Kross personally recruited to 
assist in her experiment.
78
  
The Wayward Minors‘ Court magistrate also determined at 
arraignment whether the accused ―shall be returned home pending 
investigation or detained elsewhere; and . . . [whether] provision for 
physical and mental examinations‖ was necessary.79 Notably, 
institutional detention was considered ―remand by consent‖ and seen 
by the court‘s workers as an important criminal procedure 
―innovation.‖80 Although there had been no formal adjudication or 
finding of guilt at this stage, the young women were held at 
residential facilities like the Florence Crittenton League or the House 
 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 6 (―Sufficient Intake Information having been provided, the Magistrate sets an 
adjourned date, and orders a complete investigation of all pertinent circumstances be made by 
the Probation Department . . . or any other cooperating agency.‖). Intake staff were required to 
complete a lengthy set of forms for the judge noting the accused‘s educational, religious, and 
mental health background, ―home conditions,‖ and medical history. Id. at 10. See also CLARKE, 
supra note 61, at 12.  
 77. See Quinn, Lady Vols, supra note 57, at 3. 
 78. Id. 
 79. KROSS, supra note 62, at 5–6. 
 80. CLARKE, supra note 61, at 14–15. 
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of Good Shepherd for between one and four weeks so that a more 
thorough social work investigation could be completed.
81
 
In her 1941 evaluation and review of the courts, Dorris Clarke, a 
liaison officer in the Wayward Minors‘ Court,82 noted: 
 This [initial detention], of course, raised numerous 
questions as to the legality of detaining a person beyond the 
statutory period of seventy-two hours, without hearing. 
Questions were also raised as to whether a minor could 
―consent‖ to such deprivation of liberty; or whether a parent, 
who was a complainant against her daughter, could ―consent‖ 
to such detention.
83
 
 Given the court‘s problem-solving orientation, however, Clarke 
believed the potentially illegal processes were generally defensible:  
Actually, no harm was done to any of these girls and all were 
glad to consent to such shelter—and, as a matter of fact, many, 
on the adjourned date, requested to be returned to the 
institution. The question of the legality of the procedure, 
however, continued to disturb those of us concerned with the 
proper functioning of this court.
84
 
 
 81. Id. This was also considered a way to help reduce tension between the parties. Id. 
 82. In Kross‘s 1936 booklet, PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH WAYWARD MINORS IN 
NEW YORK CITY, she indicated that Dorris Clarke, an attorney and social worker, was the 
―Project Supervisor of Works Progress Administration Project Number 165-97-6042, entitled 
‗A Study of Sex Delinquency and Social Diseases in New York City‘ [and had] been appointed 
as a liaison officer between Judge Kross and the Probation Department.‖ KROSS, supra note 62, 
at 7–8. Clarke was one of several women and compatriots of Kross who, I argue in a 
forthcoming work, was engaged in legal realism in the trenches rather than from the Ivory 
Tower. See Mae C. Quinn, Feminist Legal Realism?: Realistic Women in the Trenches, on the 
Benches, and Beyond (Sept. 23, 2009) (unpublished draft on file with author); see also Mae C. 
Quinn, Further (Ms.)Understanding Legal Realism: Rescuing Judge Anna Moscowitz Kross, 88 
TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 43 (2009).  
 83. CLARKE, supra note 61, at 15. 
 84. Id. Clarke called for legislative adoption of the various informal processes used in the 
Wayward Minors‘ Court. Dorris Clarke, Treatment of the Delinquent Adolescent Girl: By 
Court, or Administrative Tribunal?, 21 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 225, 248 (1946). Her efforts 
apparently were successful—a 1951 change in the law codified some portion of the informal 
features of Kross‘s experimental court. See FISHER, supra note 63, at 22 (noting that the Girls‘ 
Term Act ―became effective June 1, 1951 and validated the court which had been functioning 
for a number of years under the Wayward Minor Act‖). 
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To protect against legal challenges, the court ultimately modified 
its procedures. Thereafter, the magistrate was required to complete a 
form at the time of remand indicating that the defendant was 
―arraigned and advised of [her] rights, [and] has consented to 
necessary shelter, examination, and care at your institution pending 
further disposition of the charges at the Wayward Minors‘ Court.‖85  
Before the defendant‘s next court appearance, the investigating 
agent presented the gathered information to the presiding judge, 
usually Kross.
86
 This information included further facts underlying 
the complaint; a full social history of the accused; and additional 
mental and physical health data, including details about the woman‘s 
sexual history.
87
 With this information, the court established an 
individualized treatment plan and adjourned the matter for further 
informal supervision.
88
 ―Further supervision‖ frequently involved 
venereal disease testing and treatment, still without any formal 
finding of guilt.
89
  
 
 85. FISHER, supra note 63, at 22. There were a variety of public and private facilities that 
received the young women, but many of these facilities were religious institutions or placed 
restrictions on who they would accept. Id. at 18–19. Indeed, the only facilities available to 
African-American defendants were the House of Detention, City Prison, a state reformatory, or 
the Westfield State farm. Id. at 19. See generally Cheryl D. Hicks, ―In Danger of Becoming 
Morally Depraved‖: Single Black Women, Working-Class Black Families, and New York 
State‘s Wayward Minor Laws: 1917–1928, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 2077, 2095–2101 (2003). 
 86. KROSS, supra note 62, at 9–13. Kross explained that previously ―special emphasis was 
laid on the immediate charges‖ and ―[l]ittle effort was made to unearth facts which might 
indicate the seeming delinquency was motivated by unfortunate or undesirable factors 
extraneous to the immediate complaint.‖ Id. at 14. 
 87. KROSS, supra note 62, at 9–12. This information would be presented to the judge in a 
folder along with interview notes, correspondence, and reports from other agencies that may 
have had prior contact with the accused. Id. See also CLARKE, supra note 61, at 13 (explaining 
that the investigation between arraignment and first appearance was ―a radical departure from 
the ordinary adult court routine‖ and that ―question has been raised as to its legality,‖ but that it 
appeared to be permitted under section 913 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows a 
magistrate to have before her ―prior to or after adjudication‖ such information as will assist in 
deciding the case). Clarke also noted that ―[r]egardless of the legal aspects . . . this procedure 
has more than justified itself socially,‖ as this information has allowed the court to determine in 
most instances that adjustment without the ―stigma of adjudication‖ is possible. Id. at 28. 
 88. KROSS, supra note 62, at 14.  
 89. For instance, between March and November, 1936, in 105 of the 172 cases that 
received court attention, the defendants were examined by the Board of Health for venereal 
diseases. KROSS, supra note 62, at 41. Sixty-two of the young women were determined to be 
disease-free, while thirty-three were found to be infected. Id. Only eight of them were allowed 
to receive ―ambulatory‖ treatment; the remaining twenty-five were hospitalized. Id. See also 
CLARKE, supra note 61, at 16. Clarke noted that, ―[w]hile physical examinations are not 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 31:57 
 
 
While under the court‘s supervision, the defendant repeatedly 
returned to court for conferences so the judge could maintain 
―personal contact in each case . . . until rehabilitation [was] 
assured.‖90 Not unlike practices in today‘s drug courts, the judge 
conferenced the matter with court staff and other supervisory agents 
prior to each court appearance to learn about the defendant‘s 
progress.
91
 If necessary, ―changes of plans [would be] recommended‖ 
and defendants might be ―remanded during long adjournments, for 
treatment at a hospital, or for correction and training at a private or 
public institution.‖92  
This method of handling the case ―on the basis of preadjudicated, 
unofficial, probationary supervision,‖ as with the first remand and 
adjournment, was ―predicated on the implied consent of the 
defendant.‖93 Kross conceded that this consent generally was 
extracted from the defendant using ―moral suasion,‖94 and that the 
court ―accomplish[ed] its object[ives] by a resort to expedients, 
contemplated in [its] inception, but not clearly authorized‖ by law.95 
One such ―expedient,‖ Kross explained, was for ―the Magistrate to 
sign a commitment [order] to the House of Detention, at the time of 
arraignment to be used if the contingency‖ arose.96  
In the end, defendants who were ―recalcitrant‖ or appeared to 
have ―no prospect of an adjustment pursuant to the plans suggested,‖ 
could be brought to trial, adjudicated wayward minors, and 
immediately sentenced to an institution.
97
 Those who demonstrated 
that ―desired results were underway,‖ would have their cases 
 
required in all cases, in general, in the case of sex offenders or defendants referred to a place of 
detention or shelter, an examination for possible venereal infection is made by the Board of 
Health or by doctors attached to the institution.‖ Id. The young women were also frequently 
tested for pregnancy. Id. 
 90. KROSS, supra note 62, at 14.  
 91. Id. at 14–15, 30–31 (explaining that these conferences took place before the defendant 
appeared in court, ―thus providing ample opportunity for a full discussion of all factors without 
hampering the therapeutic treatment in the case‖).  
 92. Id. at 14–15.  
 93. Id. at 18.  
 94. Id. at 29.  
 95. Kross & Grossman, Suggested Improvements, supra note 61, at 439. 
 96. KROSS, supra note 62, at 30. According to Dorris Clarke, ―commitment [was] resorted 
to only after all other expedients ha[d] been tried.‖ CLARKE, supra note 61, at 10.  
 97. KROSS, supra note 62, at 18–19.  
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dismissed, but would continue to be monitored informally by Kross‘s 
volunteers.
98
  
Like today‘s court reform advocates, Kross was a vocal 
spokesperson for her experiments. She made sure her courts received 
media attention for their unusual socio-legal approach—sometimes 
writing news articles herself—while she pressed for their replication 
across the country.
99
 As early as the first year of its operation, Kross 
announced her hope that the Wayward Minors‘ Court would ―serve 
as a model for an impetus to the establishment of similar Courts 
elsewhere . . . .‖100 Similar to today‘s reformers, she attempted to 
maintain records and statistics to share with others interested in 
replicating her experimental venue, claiming they demonstrated the 
success of her ―scientific‖ approach.101 In this way, Kross became 
well-known for her ―improvisation‖ and ―zeal.‖102  
Despite Kross‘s strong advocacy and personal public relations 
campaign, her criminal court experiments were largely criticized and 
ultimately abandoned. Kross‘s use of volunteers and outsiders to run 
her courts brought them—and her—under tremendous scrutiny.103 
For her alleged personal overreaching and privatization of the judicial 
system, Kross herself became the center of a Department of 
Investigation probe.
104
 
During the 1950s, a study by various legal and social work experts 
indicated that Kross‘s approach to dealing with social issues through 
criminal courts was too fragmented.
105
 It resulted in more confusion 
 
 98. Id. at 17. In 1940, 264 of the 330 defendants who came through intake were referred 
for official court action and arraignment. CLARKE, supra note 61, at 51. However, of the 264 
arraigned, only 123 had their cases dismissed without adjudication, and twenty-eight remained 
on ―informal‖ probation at the end of the year. Id. Of the rest, ninety-six were adjudicated and 
placed on formal probation or committed to an institution. Id. The remainder absconded or were 
wanted on warrants. Id.  
 99. See, e.g., Anna M. Kross, Hypocrisy Scored in Penal Methods, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 
1937, at 99; Expand Social Service Work, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1938, at 21; see also Quinn, 
Lady Vols, supra note 57, at 8–9. 
 100. KROSS, supra note 62, at 14–15.  
 101. See id.  
 102. GELLHORN, supra note 64, at 227–31. 
 103. See Quinn, Lady Vols supra note 57, at 11–12. 
 104. Id. 
 105. GELLHORN, supra note 64; see also CMTY. SERV. SOC‘Y OF N.Y., A NEW PATTERN 
FOR FAMILY JUSTICE: PROPOSAL FOR UNIFICATION OF COURTS DEALING WITH CHILD, YOUTH, 
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for litigants than help.
106
 Similarly, running a variety of 
individualized, specialized courts—each with its own special social 
focus—was costly.107 Indeed, Kross‘s programs were so costly that 
they never expanded in the way she envisioned, despite her own 
rigorous fundraising campaigns.
108
  
Moreover, while social work intervention might be helpful for 
children and families in distress, critics believed this was best 
accomplished outside of the criminal court system.
109
 Important 
commentators like Paul Tappan argued further that the court‘s 
treatment methods were not sufficiently effective or scientific,
110
 but 
rather were reflective of the personal morality and biases of those 
involved in their creation.
111
 When New York‘s courts were 
reorganized in the 1960s, the kind of therapeutic intervention 
common in the Wayward Minors‘ Court was found to be best suited 
for the civil family court setting.
112
 The Magistrates‘ Court system 
was completely abolished in 1962.
113
 
Indeed, this criticism and dismantling of Kross‘s problem-solving 
courts occurred as legal protections for accused persons were being 
expanded to include the set of rights well-accepted in today‘s 
 
AND FAMILY PROBLEMS 24 (1954) (describing New York City‘s Magistrates‘ system social 
courts, most started by Kross, as ―a galaxy of courts with fragmented jurisdiction‖). 
 106. GELLHORN, supra note 64; see also CMTY. SERV. SOC‘Y OF N.Y., supra note 105, at 
5–7.  
 107. GELLHORN, supra note 64, at 227–31. 
 108. Kross even contributed her own funds to support the courts. KROSS, supra note 62, at 
24. 
 109. See CMTY. SERV. SOC‘Y OF N.Y., supra note 105, at 27 (―In general we believe it to be 
desirable to avoid an interlacing of the purely judicial function of making preliminary and final 
dispositions of cases with the purely administrative function of performing therapeutic social 
treatment services.‖). 
 110. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (referring to the nearly one-third of 1940 
defendants whose cases resulted in formal disposition despite their participation in the 
Wayward Minors‘ Court, and the less than one-half who were rewarded with case dismissal by 
the end of the year); see also FISHER, supra note 63, at 27 (recounting that in 1952, of the 624 
girls who were seen in the Girls‘ Term Court, a modified version of the Wayward Minors‘ 
Court, 357 (57.2 percent) were ―convicted,‖ with many being sent to reformatories).  
 111. See generally PAUL W. TAPPAN, CRIME, JUSTICE AND CORRECTION (1960); PAUL W. 
TAPPAN, DELINQUENT GIRLS IN COURT (Patterson Smith 1969) (1947) [hereinafter TAPPAN, 
DELINQUENT GIRLS]; see also Paul W. Tappan, Unofficial Delinquency, 29 NEB. L. REV. 547 
(1949–50); Paul W. Tappan, Treatment Without Trial, 24 SOC. FORCES 306 (1945–46).  
 112. See Quinn, Women‘s Court, supra note 57, at 694. 
 113. See id. at 695; see also AARON D. SAMUELS, FAMILY COURT LAW AND PRACTICE IN 
NEW YORK 9 (1964). 
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criminal justice system.
114
 For instance, during this same time period, 
the Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright, ensuring the right 
to counsel for indigent criminal defendants in certain cases.
115
 The 
Supreme Court also recognized individual privacy and the right to 
silence as core values.
116
 During this period, civil rights lawyers and 
the criminal defense bar became more organized and were widely 
recognized as an important force.
117
 Kross‘s efforts to engage in 
social engineering through criminal courts were seen by many, 
including Tappan, as inconsistent with these emerging conceptions of 
individual civil rights and liberties.
118
  
Kross‘s story has been largely left out of the accounts of 
contemporary reformers who claim that they have established the 
first problem-solving courts. But like experimental courts such as the 
Wayward Minors‘ Part from decades ago, today‘s problem-oriented 
venues utilize informal procedures and the coercive power of the 
court to try to change the way people live their lives. By adopting a 
carrot and stick approach in an attempt to ―save‖ people, we again are 
engaging in social engineering through the criminal courts.
119
 In so 
 
 114. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 299–303 
(1993) (―Under Earl Warren, the Supreme Court moved boldly, using the incorporation doctrine 
as a sword to slash through state practices that the Court felt were retrograde and unfair….In 
form, the cases decided by the Supreme Court were often about procedures, due process, and so 
on; but on a deeper level they were about substance, content.‖). 
 115. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 116. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966). 
 117. In New York City, for example, the Legal Aid Society came to be assigned the 
primary defender in criminal court parts.  
 118. See supra note 111 (citing Tappan‘s work); see also FISHER, supra note 63, at 59 (―In 
some of our social courts, the defense counselor has become a peripheral figure in the 
proceedings, and in one court, at least, he has been discarded altogether.‖); FISHER, supra note 
63, at 31 (―Apprised of the immoderate results of proceedings in this court, is it not occasion to 
question whether crime prevention might be better conducted elsewhere in an agency fashioned 
for the task? And must we not wonder, too, whether outcomes would be so extreme if girls, for 
whom court authority is necessary or desirable, were protected by more rigorous legal 
safeguards.‖); CMTY. SERV. SOC‘Y OF N.Y., supra note 105, at 26–27 (―The legal rights of 
defendants, plaintiffs, respondents and petitioners would be more fully safeguarded by a court 
which keeps within the traditional limits of adjudication than would be the case were the court 
to make its dispositions according to the context of plans for remedial treatment, in the 
outworking of which justices may be occasional participants and for which they may develop a 
special attachment.‖). 
 119. See Quinn, Women‘s Court, supra note 57, at 713–22; see also MICHAEL WILLRICH, 
CITY OF COURTS (2003). 
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doing, we are returning to anachronistic practices that grew out of the 
Progressive Era's paternalistic concern for sexually active young 
women that many, even at the time, argued were deeply troubling.
120
 
Now, however, we are applying these practices to autonomous 
adults.
121
  
CONCLUSION 
As we embark on another new era and presidential administration, 
it is a good time to pause and take stock of our nation‘s efforts to 
solve its problems through criminal courts. To be clear, this Article is 
not written to squelch innovation. Indeed, it calls for innovation in 
the ways that we innovate.  
Policymakers should consider all voices—agnostics, critics, as 
well as those from days gone by—as they work to improve courts.122 
The missing accounts discussed in this Article suggest that we should 
stop pouring money into problem-solving courts to simply encourage 
further experimentation. And true success in specialized courts 
should be measured not only by improved outcomes, but also by 
 
 120. See, e.g., TAPPAN, DELINQUENT GIRLS, supra note 111. For a more contemporary 
critique of the protective, psychoanalytic practices of female-focused courts like Kross‘s 
―Home Term‖, see RACHEL DEVLIN, RELATIVE INTIMACY: FATHERS, ADOLESCENT 
DAUGHTERS, AND POSTWAR AMERICAN CULTURE 50 (2005). According to Devlin: 
Assumptions of long standing in which most female delinquency was viewed as sexual 
in nature and economic in origin was replaced with a perspective that considered 
sexual behavior and other delinquencies as merely incidental to underlying 
psychological problems connected to girls‘ family experiences. Predictably, those 
disorders were rooted in Oedipal dysfunction—most prominently the problem of 
―Oedipal impasse,‖ a diagnosis that owed much to ideas about adolescent Oedipal 
―frustration‖ and ―conflict.‖  
Id. 
 121. See Mae C. Quinn, Reconceptualizing Competence: An Appeal, 66 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 259 (2009) [hereinafter Quinn, Reconceptualizing Competence]. 
 122. At the June 11, 2009, Anaheim NADCP Conference, Gil Kerlikowske, Director of the 
Office of the National Drug Control Policy, addressed the 2,500 attendees, congratulating them 
on their years of hard work and pledging the administration‘s ongoing support. See R. Gil 
Kerlikowske, Dir., Office of Nat‘l Drug Control Policy, Statement at the National Association 
of Drug Court Professionals 15th Annual Conference (June 11, 2009) (transcript available at the 
White House Drug Policy Website, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/speech09/ 
061109_kerlikowske.pdf). Indeed, the new ―drug czar‖ publically delivered a letter from 
President Obama congratulating the attendees on their ―life-saving‖ work, and noting the 
President‘s goal to support drug courts with $117.9 million in federal funds in 2010 alone.  
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proven compliance with legal standards. New state courts, like new 
medications, should not receive federal support or approval without 
proper study, testing, and vetting, as well as delivery of promised 
results.  
Perhaps in each jurisdiction one model problem-solving court 
could be created and carefully monitored over a substantial period of 
time with federal financing, not just by the court‘s planners and 
proponents, but by a truly cross-cutting panel of both legal and 
social-science experts.
123
 The court‘s legal practices and therapeutic 
or other outcomes could be assessed to ensure that the institution 
complies with existing standards of law and delivers meaningful 
services that do, in fact, work to solve problems.
124
 If necessary, 
courtroom processes and treatment modes could be modified over 
time to ensure that particularized best practices are developed and 
delivered. Further federal funding for replication of these institutions 
would not be provided until optimum features were established for a 
given jurisdiction, defendant population, and the like.  
Future attempts to solve this country's problems should not be 
driven solely by the criminal court reformers who have dominated the 
conversation to date.
125
 It is healthy to hope. But if we wish to avoid 
repeating history‘s criminal justice mistakes,126 better informed, more 
 
 123. Cf. Quinn, Reconceputalizing Competence, supra note 121. 
 124. See Jeremy Kohomban, Paul Schiller & Patricia O‘Gorman, Evidence-Based 
Practice—Developing a New Business Model from the Inside Out, LINK: CONNECTING 
JUVENILE JUST. & CHILD WELFARE, Spring 2008, at 1, available at http://www.cwla.org/ 
programs/juvenilejustice/thelink2008spring.pdf; see also Randal Lea, Mandy Lewis & Steven 
Hornsby, TEEN. DEP‘T OF CHILDREN‘S SERVS., PROGRESS TOWARD EVIDENCE-BASED 
PRACTICES IN DCS FUNDED JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRAMS: REPORT TO GOVERNOR PHIL 
BREDESEN AND THE TENNESSEE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (2008), http://www.tennessee.gov/youth/ 
providers/585_12.31.08.pdf. 
 125. At the June 11, 2009, Training Conference of the National Association of Drug Court 
Professionals (NADCP) in Anaheim, California, marking the organization‘s fifteenth 
Anniversary, its Chief Executive Officer, West Huddleston, stated: ―After twenty years of 
research and results we can now say that Drug Courts are the most successful justice 
intervention in our nation‘s history. . . . They are a solution to the vicious cycle of drugs and 
crime that has ensnared 1.2 million drug-addicted offenders in our criminal justice system. We 
must put a Drug Court within reach of every American in need.‖ U.S. Drug Czar Addresses 
2,500 Drug Court Professionals, Voices Strong Support for Expanding Drug Courts 
Throughout the Nation, REUTERS, June 11, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
pressRelease/idUS146385+11-Jun-2009+PRN20090611.  
 126. See Quinn, Women‘s Court, supra note 57, at 726. 
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balanced, and truly thoughtful discourse about problem-solving 
courts must inform our decisions.
127
 
 
 127. In contrast, the Department of Justice‘s Office of Justice Programs Website currently 
displays a link to A NEW WAY OF DOING BUSINESS: A CONVERSATION ABOUT THE STATEWIDE 
COORDINATION OF DRUG COURT. This report is intended to be ―a guide to governments as they 
think about how to coordinate problem-solving courts on a statewide basis.‖ See ROBERT V. 
WOLF, CENTER FOR CT. INNOVATION, A NEW WAY OF DOING BUSINESS: A CONVERSATION 
ABOUT THE STATEWIDE COORDINATION OF DRUG COURT 1 (2009), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
BJA/pdf/CCI_ps_roundtable.pdf. Its recommendations are drawn from a ―roundtable 
conversation‖ involving ―eighteen policymakers, researchers, and practitioners‖ brought 
together by the Center for Court Innovation and the Bureau of Justice Assistance. Id. Notably, 
not a single representative of the practicing defense bar was among the eighteen invitees, nearly 
all of whom are well-known problem-solving court supporters. See id. at 2.  
 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol31/iss1/5
